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___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellants Christopher G. Wright, Ravinder S. 
Chawla, and Andrew Teitelman filed this interlocutory appeal 
from the District Court’s denial of their pretrial joint motion 
to preclude the Government from relitigating certain issues 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause and from constructively 
amending the indictment.  Because the District Court’s ruling 
is not a “collateral” order subject to immediate review under 
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 
(1949), and was not otherwise a “final decision[]” under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, we lack jurisdiction to consider their appeal.  
Accordingly, we will dismiss this appeal and remand for 
further proceedings. 
I.  
We have already had occasion to describe the facts 
underlying this case in United States v. Wright, 665 F.3d 560 
(3d Cir. 2012), and that description of the facts is important 
for understanding the matter before us now: 
From 2005 through 2007, Wright 
was Chief of Staff to Philadelphia 
City Councilman John “Jack” 
Kelly.  Wright was also a realtor.  
Chawla owned the real estate firm 
World Acquisition Partners 
(“World Acquisition”), and 
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Teitelman, an attorney, did most 
of the firm’s legal work.  
Teitelman was not a World 
Acquisition employee, but his 
offices were in its office suite, and 
most of his work came from 
World Acquisition.  Chawla and 
Teitelman befriended Wright 
when Wright had an office in the 
same building. 
This case concerns a series of 
gifts that Chawla, Teitelman, or 
both gave Wright and a 
simultaneous series of official acts 
that Wright took on behalf of 
World Acquisition.  Wright 
received a free stint in an 
apartment, free legal services, and 
was promised commissions on 
World Acquisition deals.  At the 
same time, Wright shepherded a 
bill that Chawla favored through 
Kelly’s office, arranged meetings 
about a World Acquisition 
development, and communicated 
with City of Philadelphia offices 
for World Acquisition. 
More specifically, Wright 
received three main benefits.  
First, he lived at least part-time in 
an apartment (with a free parking 
space) for 14 months without 
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paying rent.  World Acquisition 
had contracted to buy a building 
at 2000 Delancey Street in 
Philadelphia, then sold its right to 
buy the building to another 
purchaser.  Meanwhile, Wright 
was in divorce proceedings and 
struggled with alcohol abuse.  
Teitelman, concerned for Wright, 
helped him move into one of the 
building's vacant units.  The 
parties contest the extent to which 
Chawla knew about this 
arrangement.  The new 
purchaser’s agent soon discovered 
Wright, who left the apartment 
months later after the new 
purchaser sought to evict him. 
Second, Wright received free 
legal help from Teitelman and his 
associate.  When the Delancey 
Street building’s new owner 
attempted to evict Wright, 
Teitelman defended him.  
Teitelman also took over 
negotiations with the lawyer for 
Wright’s wife when Wright could 
no longer afford his previous 
divorce lawyer.  Finally, 
Teitelman defended Wright in a 
bank foreclosure against Wright’s 
marital home.  For all that work, 
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Teitelman billed Wright but $350, 
and did so only after Teitelman 
learned that the FBI was 
investigating their relationship.  
As with the apartment, the parties 
contest Chawla’s involvement. 
Third, Wright was promised 
commissions in his capacity as a 
realtor.  He occasionally “brought 
deals” to World Acquisition in the 
same manner that any realtor 
could, but none of those deals 
succeeded, so Wright never 
earned anything.  On one 
occasion, World Acquisition 
granted Wright and his partner the 
exclusive right to approach a 
buyer for a $100 million property.  
Had Wright succeeded in making 
the sale, he would have earned a 
commission of $6 million, but that 
deal also fell through. Chawla 
offered Wright “liaison work” as 
well, but Wright declined that 
offer. 
While he was receiving those 
benefits, Wright took three sets of 
actions as Councilman Kelly’s 
Chief of Staff that tended to 
benefit World Acquisition.  First, 
Wright helped Kelly propose and 
pass a “mechanical parking” 
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ordinance.  Philadelphia law 
required developers planning to 
install mechanical parking to get a 
zoning variance, a time-
consuming process.  At 
Teitelman’s behest, Wright set up 
a meeting at which Chawla and 
his partner suggested that Kelly 
change that law.  Kelly, who 
usually took a pro-development 
stance, agreed.  Chawla and 
Teitelman prodded Wright to 
make the bill a priority, and Kelly 
soon after introduced the bill.  
The City Council passed it by a 
vote of 15–0. 
Second, Wright helped Chawla 
oppose an ordinance that would 
cripple a planned World 
Acquisition project.  Chawla 
envisioned a large development 
called “River City” south and 
west of Philadelphia’s Logan 
Square, where low-rise residences 
predominate.  When the 
neighborhood association 
protested, Wright arranged a 
meeting between Chawla and 
association leaders.  Afterward, 
Wright wrote Chawla and 
Teitelman advising that his “role 
as Jack’s Chief of Staff” should 
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be to focus City staff on River 
City’s benefits.  Nonetheless, in 
the face of continued opposition, 
the City Council passed a 
building-height restriction that 
thwarted the River City plans.  
Kelly joined the 15–0 vote. 
Third, Wright worked with other 
City offices on World 
Acquisition’s behalf.  When the 
Parking Authority was selling a 
certain property, Wright 
forwarded public information 
about its “request for proposal” 
process to Chawla and Teitelman.  
Wright also arranged a 
walkthrough of the property.  He 
obtained public information for 
World Acquisition from 
Philadelphia Gas Works through a 
high-level official rather than 
through the main call center.  
Finally, Wright worked with the 
City's Department of Licenses and 
Inspections on a certification that 
the River City property was not 
encumbered with zoning 
violations.  City Council staff 
often did so for their constituents, 
though this certification was 
unusually complicated. 
10 
 
In 2008, a federal grand jury 
returned a fourteen-count 
indictment against Chawla, 
Teitelman, Wright, and Chawla’s 
brother Hardeep.  The indictment 
charged honest services fraud, 
traditional fraud, conspiracy to 
commit both kinds of fraud, and 
bribery in connection with a 
federally funded program.  After a 
four-week jury trial, including 
five days of deliberations, the jury 
convicted Chawla, Teitelman, and 
Wright on three counts: (1) 
conspiracy to commit honest 
services and traditional fraud 
(Count One); (2) honest services 
fraud for the apartment 
arrangement (Count Ten); and (3) 
traditional fraud for the apartment 
arrangement (Count Twelve).  
The jury further convicted Chawla 
alone on one honest services 
count for offering Wright liaison 
work (Count Three).  It acquitted 
on the other ten counts and 
acquitted Hardeep Chawla of all 
counts. 
The District Court sentenced 
Wright to 48 months’ 
imprisonment, Chawla to 30 
months, and Teitelman to 24 
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months, followed in each case by 
two years of supervised release.  
It also imposed fines and special 
assessments on each person. 
Id. at 564–67. 
Wright, Teitelman, and Chawla appealed their 
convictions.  See generally id.  Their primary argument on 
appeal was that the intervening decision in Skilling v. United 
States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010)—establishing that the federal 
honest-services fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, criminalized 
only fraudulent schemes based on bribery or kickbacks—
undermined the validity of their convictions.  We agreed 
that Appellants’ convictions for honest-sevices fraud on 
Counts One, Three, and Ten may have been predicated on a 
now-impermissible theory of liability, and thus vacated those 
convictions and remanded for a new trial.  Because 
prejudicial spillover may have tainted the traditional fraud 
convictions on Count Twelve, those convictions too were 
vacated. 
On remand, Appellants filed a joint motion under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause to limit the scope of the new trial, 
“to prevent relitigation of issues that were necessarily decided 
in their favor when the jury acquitted them on several 
counts.”  Appellants’ Br. at 4.  Appellants also sought to bar 
certain arguments from the Government that they believed 
would constructively amend the indictment.  In an order filed 
on February 4, 2013, followed by an accompanying 
memorandum on April 5, 2013, the District Court denied the 
motion except as to evidence of a $1000 check paid to Wright 
by Hardeep Chawla (the only defendant acquitted of all 
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charges).  United States v. Wright, 936 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. 
Pa. 2013).1  Appellants timely appealed. 
II.  
Although our jurisdiction over substantial aspects of 
this appeal is not contested, we have an independent duty to 
ascertain whether we do indeed have jurisdiction.  See Metro 
Transp. Co. v. N. Star Reinsurance Co., 912 F.2d 672, 676 
(3d Cir. 1990) (“Where counsel has not satisfied us that 
jurisdiction is present, we are obliged to raise that issue on 
our own initiative.”).  Our review of this threshold question 
is, of course, plenary.  In re Blatstein, 192 F.3d 88, 94 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  
                                              
1 Also on remand, the Government and Appellants 
attempted to enter into plea agreements under Rule 
11(c)(1)(C), under which Chawla and Teitelman would plead 
guilty to a misdemeanor conspiracy to defraud the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, while 
Wright would plead guilty to being an accessory after the fact 
to that offense, all with promised sentences of time served.  In 
March 2013, the District Court rejected the pleas as “too 
lenient in light of the seriousness of the charged crimes” and 
“contrary to the public interest.”  United States v. Wright, 291 
F.R.D. 85, 90 (E.D. Pa. 2013).  The parties do not appeal that 
order. 
13 
 
III.  
A.  
The principal statutory basis for our jurisdiction over 
appeals taken by criminal defendants is 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
which permits us to review almost all “final decisions” of the 
federal district courts.  This “final judgment” rule ordinarily 
“prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition of 
sentence” in a criminal case.  Flanagan v. United States, 465 
U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (citations omitted).  At issue here is the 
collateral-order exception announced in Cohen v. Beneficial 
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), which gives us 
latitude to exercise immediate review over orders that, 
although not “final” in the traditional sense, “conclusively 
determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue 
completely separate from the merits of the action, and [are] 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” 
 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) 
(citations omitted).   
Time and again, the Supreme Court has reiterated the 
limited nature of this doctrine: 
[W]e have not mentioned 
applying the collateral order 
doctrine recently without 
emphasizing its modest scope. 
See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. 
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 
863, 868 (1994) (“[T]he ‘narrow’ 
exception should stay that way 
and never be allowed to swallow 
the general rule that a party is 
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entitled to a single appeal, to be 
deferred until final judgment has 
been entered . . . .” (citation 
omitted)).  And we have meant 
what we have said; although the 
Court has been asked many times 
to expand the “small class” of 
collaterally appealable orders, we 
have instead kept it narrow and 
selective in its membership. 
Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006).  This admonition 
holds special significance in criminal cases, where we must 
apply the collateral-order exception “with the utmost 
strictness,” Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 265, primarily “to avoid 
delays due to piecemeal appellate litigation, as these delays 
may work to the detriment of the rights of the defendant or 
prejudice the prosecution’s ability to prove its case.”  United 
States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citations omitted).  Such appeals are thus permitted “only in 
the most rare and exceptional circumstances.”  Id. at 245 
(citing Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 270). 
One such exceptional circumstance is sometimes 
presented by a district court’s denial of a colorable claim 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.  See Abney v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977).  The rationale is that the 
Clause, which states that no person shall “be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,” U.S. 
Const. amend. V, protects a defendant not only from being 
convicted after a second trial on the same offense, but also 
from suffering the burden of a second trial itself.  See Abney, 
431 U.S. at 660–62.  Once that second trial has occurred, 
whether the defendant has been convicted or acquitted, full 
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post-trial relief is impossible.  Thus, where a double-jeopardy 
claim is “effectively unreviewable” after trial under Cohen, 
the collateral-order doctrine permits interlocutory review. 
Appellants’ argument rests upon the Double Jeopardy 
Clause’s incorporation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 
also known as issue preclusion, which “can bar the 
relitigation of an issue actually decided in a defendant’s favor 
by a valid and final judgment.”  United States v. Merlino, 310 
F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 
U.S. 436, 443 (1970)).  In a recent en banc opinion, we 
explained that a defendant who seeks to avail himself of 
collateral estoppel bears the “heavy burden” of 
“demonstrating that the issue he seeks to foreclose was 
actually decided in the first proceeding.”  United States v. 
Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 217 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citations 
omitted).   
B.  
The first substantial question presented by this appeal 
is whether the District Court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to 
preclude based on collateral estoppel justifies interlocutory 
appeal under Cohen and Abney.  It is undisputed that where 
collateral estoppel bars “retrial of a charge,” a defendant may 
seek immediate review.  United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 
113, 125 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing United States v. Venable, 585 
F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1978)).  But we have expressed doubt 
that such jurisdiction exists “when the collateral estoppel 
claim would at most suppress some evidence but not preclude 
trial on the charge.”  Id. at 125 n.22 (citing United States v. 
Mock, 604 F.2d 336, 337–41 (5th Cir. 1979)).  The root of 
that concern stems from Abney itself, in which the Supreme 
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Court announced a critical distinction between allegations of 
constitutional injury and mere evidentiary error: 
[T]he very nature of a double 
jeopardy claim is such that it is 
collateral to, and separable from 
the principal issue at the 
accused’s impending criminal 
trial, i.e., whether or not the 
accused is guilty of the offense 
charged.  In arguing that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment bars his 
prosecution, the defendant makes 
no challenge whatsoever to the 
merits of the charge against him.  
Nor does he seek suppression of 
evidence which the Government 
plans to use in obtaining a 
conviction.  Rather, he is 
contesting the very authority of 
the Government to hale him into 
court to face trial on the charge 
against him. 
431 U.S. at 659 (citations omitted). 
Based on that reasoning, seven of our sister courts of 
appeals have found that the touchstone for interlocutory 
jurisdiction is a collateral-estoppel claim that, if successful, 
would require dismissal of, at a minimum, an entire count.  
See United States v. Wittig, 575 F.3d 1085, 1096 (10th Cir. 
2009); United States v. Ginyard, 511 F.3d 203, 211–12 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Tom, 787 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 
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1986); United States v. Gulledge, 739 F.2d 582, 586–87 (11th 
Cir. 1984); United States v. Head, 697 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th 
Cir. 1982); United States v. Powell, 632 F.2d 754, 758 (9th 
Cir. 1980); Mock, 604 F.2d at 339–40.  None of our sister 
circuits or the federal district courts appear to have taken a 
contrary view. 
Here, Appellants were convicted at trial, by a general 
verdict, of conspiracy to commit honest-services fraud under 
Count One.  They were acquitted, with the exception of 
Chawla on Count Three, on several substantive counts of mail 
and wire fraud, each predicated on a mailing or email relating 
to a particular transaction.  These include Count Two (the 
mechanical-parking ordinance); Counts Three through Five 
(the River City development project); Counts Six and Seven 
(the Parking Authority property); Counts Eight and Eleven 
(the free legal services regarding Wright’s divorce 
proceedings and a home foreclosure action); and Count Nine 
(the corporate tax bill).  Appellants now argue that the jury 
necessarily decided that Appellants lacked criminal intent as 
to the entirety of their conduct with respect to those 
transactions.  Thus, as a matter of collateral estoppel, they 
contend that the Government must be precluded from 
introducing any evidence of those transactions, whether to 
prove criminal intent as to Count One or to prove an overt act 
in furtherance of the conspiracy charged in that count. 
According to the consensus view outlined above, the 
foremost question is whether this claim, if successful, would 
require dismissal of the indictment as a whole, or, at a 
minimum, dismissal of any single count.  In its briefing, the 
Government notes that criminal intent is an essential element 
of each of the remaining counts, and that trial “could not 
proceed if the Government were barred by collateral estoppel 
18 
 
from presenting evidence of criminal intent.”  Appellee’s Br. 
at 35–36.  By that reasoning, the Government believes that 
we have jurisdiction to review at least this facet of the District 
Court’s order now rather than after trial. 
The Government’s theory of jurisdiction is incorrect: 
Appellants did not seek to preclude the Government from 
introducing any and all evidence pertaining to criminal 
intent—nor could they have, given that the jury necessarily 
found that such intent existed with respect to the counts of 
conviction.  Instead, Appellants seek to preclude the 
Government from using only the transactions underlying the 
acquitted counts as evidence of intent. 
Appellants themselves concede that their motion, if 
granted, would not require dismissal of Count One, or of any 
other particular count in its entirety.  See Appellants’ Br. at 16 
(“Thus, even if the [motion to preclude] had been fully 
granted, at least one count would have been left untouched 
(that is, Count 12, as to all defendants; and Count 3, as to 
Chawla alone), and Count One, the multi-faceted conspiracy 
count, would only be narrowed.”).  And during oral argument 
before the District Court, counsel for Appellant Wright, 
arguing on behalf of all Appellants for purposes of their joint 
motion to preclude, noted that even if Appellants prevail on 
their double-jeopardy claim, they would still face trial on 
Count One, because the Government could still introduce 
other evidence of criminal intent, such as Wright’s use of the 
Delancey Street Apartment: 
MS. MATHEWSON: . . .  
Speaking only to honest services, 
Your Honor, [the Government is] 
perfectly welcome to retry a 
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bribery case that says . . . we 
exchanged L&I certs, PGW, 
whatever official action we 
haven’t already been acquitted on 
for the things of value we haven’t 
been acquitted on, the free 
apartment and parking space and 
the legal services on the eviction.  
That’s their case, Your Honor. 
We’re not saying throw them out 
of court as a result of double 
jeopardy. . . .  But, Your Honor, 
we have to go back to the heart of 
the double jeopardy clause, which 
is, let’s not have a deja vu trial.  
Let’s not have another case where 
we’re fighting the exact same 
issues that a jury has already  
acquitted us on. 
(App. 240.) 
Under the rule adopted by our sister circuits, then, we 
are foreclosed from considering the merits of this appeal.  
Appellants claim, however, that United States v. Serafini, 167 
F.3d 812 (3d Cir. 1999), commands a different result.  In 
Serafini, we addressed the scope of the then-current version 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3731,2 which permits the Government to seek 
                                              
2 At the time, the statute stated, in pertinent part: 
 
20 
 
interlocutory appeal from certain pre-trial orders of dismissal.  
We concluded that along with permitting an appeal from the 
dismissal of an entire count, the statute also authorized the 
Government’s appeal from an order “excising a portion of a 
count which, if not excised, would offer legal grounding for 
criminal culpability separate from whatever culpability might 
accrue from any portion or portions of the count that the trial 
court does not determine to be deficient as a matter of law.”  
Id. at 816 (emphasis added).  We based this holding on 
guidance from the Supreme Court in Sanabria v. United 
States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978), where the Court noted that § 3731 
                                                                                                     
In a criminal case an appeal by 
the United States shall lie to a 
court of appeals from a decision, 
judgment, or order of a district 
court dismissing an indictment or 
information or granting a new 
trial after verdict or judgment, as 
to any one or more counts, except 
that no appeal shall lie where the 
double jeopardy clause of the 
United States Constitution 
prohibits further prosecution. 
. . . 
The provisions of this section 
shall be liberally construed to 
effectuate its purposes. 
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1994). 
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was “expressly designed to eliminate ‘[t]echnical distinctions 
in pleadings as limitations on appeals by the United States.’”  
Id. at 69 n.23 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91–1768, p. 21 
(1970)).3 
Appellants argue that the definition of a “count” we 
adopted in Serafini with respect to that term’s use in § 3731 is 
also binding here.  In other words, they believe that, for 
double-jeopardy purposes too, we should define a “count” not 
based on the Government’s strategic choices at the pleadings 
stage but rather in functional terms as any separate “legal 
grounding for criminal culpability.”  By that view, our sister 
circuits have all adopted an unduly narrow interpretation of 
Abney, and the correct reading would permit interlocutory 
review where the defendant’s motion raises a colorable claim 
that any particular legal grounding for culpability is barred by 
collateral estoppel. 
Applying that theory to these facts, Appellants argue 
that the transactions they seek to preclude—the River City 
deal, the mechanical parking ordinance, and so on—each 
provide a separate “legal grounding for criminal culpability” 
on the conspiracy charge in two respects.  First, the conduct 
underlying any one of these transactions would arguably be 
sufficient to establish the element of criminal intent.  Second, 
each transaction arguably provides a separate and adequate 
basis for the overt-act element.  See United States v. Rankin, 
                                              
3 Congress later amended § 3731, essentially codifying 
Sanabria and Serafini by providing that that the Government 
may appeal from the dismissal of “any one or more counts, or 
any part thereof.”  18 U.S.C. § 3731 (emphasis added). 
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870 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting the overt-act 
element of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371).  Thus, if 
Appellants’ motion is meritorious, several of the 
Government’s potential theories of liability under Count One 
would be “knocked out” at trial as a matter of double 
jeopardy. 
 We find this argument unpersuasive.  Appellants offer 
no case law so much as suggesting that Sanabria or Serafini 
bear on the scope of the collateral-order doctrine as it pertains 
to appeals taken by defendants.  And this is for good reason: 
Section 3731 deals exclusively with appellate jurisdiction 
over “an appeal by the United States.”  The Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of § 3731, and ours, has always been based in 
large part on the statute’s purpose, which is “‘to remove all 
statutory barriers to Government appeals and to allow appeals 
whenever the Constitution would permit.’”  United States v. 
Farnsworth, 456 F.3d 394, 399 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975)).  A 
defendant’s right to interlocutory appeal, by contrast, remains 
subject to the constraints of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and by 
extension, the three-pronged Cohen test, which requires that 
the district court’s alleged error be “completely separate from 
the merits of the action” and “effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.”  Coopers, 437 U.S. at 468.  
Here, although the collateral-estoppel rights at issue are 
founded in the Double Jeopardy Clause, Appellants do not 
“contest[] the very authority of the Government to hale 
[them] into court to face trial on the charge[s] against 
[them].”  Abney, 431 U.S. at 659.  Instead, they concede that 
they face retrial on all counts of conviction regardless of our 
ruling on the correctness of the District Court’s opinion.  As a 
result, any errors in the District Court’s application of the 
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collateral-estoppel doctrine will merely affect the course of 
the trial, and therefore remain subject to review and redress 
through the traditional appellate process. 
 Accordingly, we will dismiss the portion of this appeal 
pertaining to the District Court’s application of the collateral-
estoppel doctrine in its order of February 4, 2013 and 
memorandum of April 5, 2013. 
C.  
The second question presented is whether we have 
jurisdiction over the denial of Appellants’ motion to preclude 
the Government from constructively amending the 
indictment.  On this point, too, Appellants argue that the 
District Court’s denial of their motion violates their 
constitutional right not to be tried, thereby triggering a right 
to interlocutory appeal under the collateral-order doctrine. 
The constitutional provision at issue is the Grand Jury 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which states that “[n]o 
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury . . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. V.  From that 
guarantee emerges the well-recognized prohibition on 
constructive amendment of the indictment at trial, which 
occurs “when evidence, arguments, or the district court’s jury 
instructions effectively ‘amend[s] the indictment by 
broadening the possible bases for conviction from that which 
appeared in the indictment.’”  United States v. McKee, 506 
F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. 
Lee, 359 F.3d 194, 208 (3d Cir. 2004)).  We have 
characterized constructive amendment as an “exceptional 
category of error” that “deprives the defendant of his/her 
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‘substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an 
indictment returned by a grand jury.’”  Id. at 229 (quoting 
United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 149 (3d Cir. 2002)); see 
also United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 531 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“‘[A] court cannot permit a defendant to be tried on 
charges that are not made in the indictment against him.’”) 
(quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960)).  
Accordingly, once a defendant on direct appeal establishes 
that a conviction was tainted by constructive amendment, we 
may redress that injury by vacating the conviction.  See, e.g., 
McKee, 506 F.3d at 232. 
The jurisdictional question presented, however, is not 
resolved simply because Appellants seek to vindicate a right 
originating from the Grand Jury Clause.  In Midland Asphalt 
Co. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794 (1989), Justice Scalia, 
writing for a unanimous court, clarified that the Clause only 
“confer[s] a right not to be tried . . . when there is no grand 
jury indictment.”  Id. at 802 (emphasis added).  In other 
words, the defect at issue must be “so fundamental that it 
causes the grand jury no longer to be a grand jury, or the 
indictment no longer to be an indictment . . . .”  Id.  By way 
of example, allegations of an “isolated breach of the 
traditional secrecy requirements,” or the grand jury’s 
violation of the defendant’s right against self-incrimination, 
are not so fundamental as to implicate a defendant’s right not 
to be tried.  Id.  
Since Midland Asphalt was decided, very few federal 
appellate courts have identified allegations of grand-jury error 
giving rise to interlocutory jurisdiction.  The Tenth Circuit, in 
a thorough treatment of the subject, limits jurisdiction under 
Midland Asphalt to review of “technical challenge[s] to the 
existence of an indictment,” such as where the defendant may 
25 
 
have been indicted by an insufficient number of grand jurors.  
United States v. Tucker, 745 F.3d 1054, 1069 (10th Cir. 
2014).   This accords with our own decisions holding that 
even allegations of failure to present exculpatory evidence, 
see United States v. Johns, 858 F.2d 154, 156–60 (3d Cir. 
1988), and prosecutorial misconduct, see United States v. 
Fisher, 871 F.2d 444, 448–49 (3d Cir. 1989), are insufficient 
to support interlocutory jurisdiction. 
We are aware of only a single decision addressing 
whether the denial of a pre-trial motion to preclude 
constructive amendment satisfies the Midland Asphalt 
standard.  In United States v. Asher, 96 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 
1996), the defendant, who had been previously convicted of 
charges stemming from participation in a stolen vehicle ring, 
was again indicted for conspiracy to commit vehicle theft and 
other offenses based on his allegedly continuing involvement 
with the same criminal enterprise.  After the district court 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, the defendant challenged that ruling on 
interlocutory appeal and also alleged that the District Court’s 
interpretation of the indictment constituted a constructive 
amendment.  The Seventh Circuit, without significant 
analysis, concluded that “[t]he district court’s alleged 
constructive amendment of the indictment is clearly not such 
a ‘fundamental’ defect in the grand jury process as to permit 
immediate appellate review under Midland Asphalt.”  Id. at 
273. 
Here, Appellants do not dispute that a properly seated 
grand jury considered the Government’s evidence and 
returned an indictment in a manner compliant with traditional 
grand jury protocols.  They allege no technical or procedural 
violation that would cause “the indictment no longer to be an 
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indictment.”  Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 802.  As a result, 
Appellants will face retrial on certain counts of that 
indictment regardless of the Government’s expected proof 
and legal theory.  If Appellants’ contentions regarding 
constructive amendment prove correct, they may seek relief 
on direct post-conviction appeal—which has long been the 
stage at which allegations of constructive amendment are 
addressed.  Accordingly, Appellants have not raised a claim 
implicating the right not to be tried under the Grand Jury 
Clause. 
 For these reasons, we will dismiss the portion of this 
appeal pertaining to the District Court’s denial of Appellants’ 
constructive-amendment claims in its order of February 4, 
2013 and memorandum of April 5, 2013. 
IV.  
In addition to asserting that we have jurisdiction under 
the collateral-order doctrine, Appellants request that we treat 
their appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus, over which 
we do indeed have jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); 
United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1981).  
Such relief, however, is extraordinary, and is appropriate only 
upon a showing of (1) a clear abuse of discretion or clear 
error of law; (2) a lack of an alternate avenue for adequate 
relief; and (3) a likelihood of irreparable injury.  See United 
States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations 
omitted).  We have already concluded that Appellants have 
not raised a claim that would result in irreparable injury if 
they are forced to pursue relief (in the event of a conviction) 
via a traditional post-trial appeal.  Mandamus relief is 
therefore unwarranted. 
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V.  
 For the aforementioned reasons, we will dismiss the 
foregoing appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.4 
                                              
4 In light of our conclusion that we lack jurisdiction to 
consider this appeal, we express no view on the merits of the 
double-jeopardy and constructive-amendment claims 
presented. 
